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How Can Morality Be In My Interest?


ABSTRACT.  It is natural to oppose morality and self-interest; it is customary also to oppose morality to interests as such, an inclination encouraged by Kantian tradition.  However, if “interest” is understood simply as what moves a person to do this rather than that, then – if persons ever actually are good and do what is right – there must be moral interests.   Bradley, in posing the “Why should I be moral?” question, raises Kant-inspired objections to the possibility of moral interests qua particular, conditional causes.  The paper argues that these objections can be met if (a) one distinguishes between what makes something right and what makes something right happen, and (b) doing what is right is intrinsic to a person’s interests and not merely a means to ulterior ends.  The requisite completeness of rational morality is shown to exclude pluralistic approaches.  Given rational monism, people can find intrinsic advantage in morality’s justifiability, cooperativeness and communality.











As young children we learned there is a difference between what we want, and what we are permitted – a restriction that often seemed as arbitrary as it was unwanted.  As adults, the relationship between what we have come to understand in terms of “self-interest” versus “morality” may remain as frustrating and perplexing as ever.  Philosophical exploration of the issue goes back at least to Plato’s Republic, where Glaucon asks Socrates whether justice (dikaiosyne) is something valuable in itself, or simply because it is rewarded by society.  With the mythological Ring of Gyges and its gift of invisibility, might not a person turn to injustice, now deprived of its customary social penalties?  But of course this is not simply a puzzle for philosophers.  Anyone, confronted by situations where decisions can affect others, may wonder whether or how to take the interests of others into account.

But exactly what are we deciding? – the framing of the choice is critical.  Putting aside the conceit that morality is really a kind of enlightened self-interest, the two presumably represent mutually exclusive alternatives.  However, it does not follow that we cannot be interested in morality as such.  The following explores the possibility of moral interests, of desiring – finding intrinsic advantage in – what is right.  Section 1 lays out the conceptual framework via specifications of “interest”, “self‑interest” and “morality”.  Bradley’s “Why should I be moral?” question is introduced in Section 2, which begins a process of refining its implications.  He poses two Kant-inspired objections to the possibility of moral interests, at least qua particular, contingent causes.  The first, that morality represents a form of intrinsic value logically distinct from interested values, is examined in Section 3.  Section 4 takes up the second, that a robust morality cannot endure being merely a means to ulterior ends.  In Section 5 it is suggested that the reason to be moral – its intrinsic advantage – lies in the very benefits of reasonableness.  But this cannot be a pluralistic reasonableness, as Section 6 shows.  We conclude, in Section 7, with an examination of some of the virtues of moral reasonableness, and ask whether an interest in such things can be enough, at least on occasion, to override a person’s nonmoral concerns.


1.  Interest, Self-interest and Morality

Interests are the things that move persons to select one outcome instead of another, the things they find that they want, like, desire, prefer, relish, etc.:  in short, the things they find to be choiceworthy.  Self-interest is conventionally understood in terms of following one’s own interests regardless of those of others.​[1]​  In isolation, following one’s own interests is unproblematic:  it simply involves deciding what to do, i.e. evaluating alternatives with respect to how well they satisfy our various interests, taking into account the likely outcomes of those alternatives, something referred to as “optimization” or “maximization”.​[2]​  However, in the proximity of other persons, the disregard of their interests can create problems, as one might expect.  Cases will arise where different persons’ concerns lead to conflicts of interest, when their wants cannot be simultaneously satisfied:  for example, two people interested in eating the same apple.

Morality purports to adjudicate or resolve these conflicts:  it imposes a restraint or constraint on the individual pursuit of interest that alleviates or avoids such collisions.​[3]​  As opposed to self-interest, which expressly disregards the interests of others, morality implicitly if not explicitly reflects some form of regard for them.  Immanuel Kant, of course, would emphatically reject any suggestion that morality, what is right, has anything to do with interests, with the contingent matters of fact about what particular persons discover to be choiceworthy:  “the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being ... but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason” (Kant 1785, p. 389).  His emphasis is on the constraint imposed by morality, which he represents in deontological terms of duty and obligation.  But, particularly in the context of conflicts of interest, it should be clear that what constrains one person’s interests automatically benefits someone else’s.  Your meeting your obligation to keep promises and tell the truth is undeniably of benefit to me, the recipient of that reliability and sooth.  In terms of interests, it’s akin to a zero-sum game:  one person’s loss is someone else’s gain.  So this characterization of morality does not immediately beg the question against Kant; after all, one person’s duty to do A is another person’s right to expect that A be done.​[4]​  

Apart from this minimal specification of morality, as some kind of constraint on one’s own interests out of regard for the interests of others, there is of course great disagreement as to its nature.  Exactly what constraint, validated how, with what implications – all of that has been left indeterminate.  This is intended to make the argument largely compatible with e.g. both Kantian and consequentialist conceptions of morality (though not relativist or pluralistic; see Section 6):  both would impose such a restraint, though the rationale and specifics would of course differ.  Still, we have enough to outline the relation between self-interest and morality:  they represent different types of reasons (motives, considerations, concerns, etc.) typically involved in the selection of different courses of action in situations involving conflicts of interest.  How do we choose between them?


2.  The Ybmoral Question

F. H. Bradley notably frames the issue in terms of what can be called the “ybmoral” question:  

(YB0)  Why should I be moral? 

(Bradley 1927, Essay 2:  “Why should I be moral?”).  The response to this has been quite varied, with reactions depending greatly upon how the question has been interpreted.​[5]​   But it seems clear that what’s being asked is, more particularly, 

(YB1)  Why should I be moral rather than self-interested?  

Or, on our minimalist construal of morality, 

(YB2)  Why should I constrain my own interests out of regard for those of others?

Apart from interests, what other reasons might a person have for such constraint?  It is generally accepted that a moral reason, understood as something logically distinct from interests, would just beg the question – it is precisely the adequacy of moral accounts that is at stake.​[6]​  How about some third kind of reason, neither interested nor moral?  Kai Nielsen promotes a version of this.

...[I]n asking “Why should I be moral?” in contexts where it is not in my self-interest to be moral, it is not clear that ... I must then be asking for a self-interested reason for not doing it.  It might instead be an aesthetic reason, an economic reason, a political reason ... or indeed the questioner may not be quite sure what kind of reason he will take as overriding .... (Nielsen 1984a, pp. 288-9.)

Alternatively, Mark Overvold is among those who suppose that moral and interested (“prudential”) reasons do not exhaust a broader (“practical”) category:  “But if there is a third source of practical reasons, practical reasons that are neither moral nor prudential, we will have a perspective for resolving conflicts between duty and interest”.​[7]​

But there is a problem with any such tertium quid.  In the present account, interests have a specific capability defined into them:  viz., they are identified as the things that in fact move a person to choose one thing rather than another, the things a person finds choiceworthy.  Consequently, there is a transparent connection between having an interest in A and choosing to do A.  More formally, “P has an interest in A” entails “P ought to choose A, all other things being equal”.​[8]​  For any other kind of consideration – be it moral, aesthetic, practical or whatever – that transparent connection is absent:  we may still want to know why that consideration should move a person to do one thing rather than another.  In other words, if there is a reason for being moral, if the ybmoral question makes sense at all, the only satisfactory answer will be in terms of interests.
 
Morality and self-interest, as understood here, are mutually exclusive:  the former has been specified as what the latter is not; it requires a regard for the interests of others that the latter repudiates.  But there are two very different ways of modeling the relation between morality and “interest” sans phrase.  The first construes them also as mutually exclusive, dichotomous things.  From that perspective, there is little reason to distinguish between interest and self-interest:  both are equally independent of, if not antagonistic to, morality.  As a result, the ybmoral question would appear, incoherently, to ask for self-interested reasons for doing something not in one’s self-interest.​[9]​  Moreover, the portrait of morality as something separate and aloof from human feelings and desires undermines its authority and relevance.  Consequently, there is a strain of thought that goes roughly like this:  “if morality is opposed to self-interest, then it is opposed to human interests; I refuse to give up my human interests, therefore I side with self-interest” (see the discussion of Kekes, Section 6).​[10]​  But on a second way of modeling the relation between morality and interest, that adopted here, morality is just one more kind of interest, alongside various nonmoral concerns like prudence and expedience.  So we can and must distinguish between interest and self-interest, for only the latter is inherently nonmoral.  More importantly, morality qua interest no longer appears as something essentially anti-interest; that is, the relevance of human feelings is not rejected but embraced, since wanting to do what is right is itself a desire.  As we shall see, an essential role for interests is even compatible with a Kant-like approach to moral rightness and goodness.  Regardless, it is crucial to understanding the present account that (morally compatible) interest not be confounded with (essentially nonmoral) self-interest.  

It is appropriate, in framing the ybmoral question, that the alternatives should be mutually exclusive; if not, there is nothing being decided between.  That is, it makes sense to represent the alternative to morality as self-interest, as something from which it is essentially distinct.  However, when we begin considering the types of reasons relevant to making this decision, on pain of incoherence it is no longer appropriate to ask for self-interested reasons.  We want to ask, more simply, whether there can be interested reasons for being moral.  So the ybmoral question becomes:  

(YB3)  Why is it in my interest to constrain my interests out of regard for the interests of others?  

This may on the surface appear itself problematic, a la someone trying to raise themselves by their own bootstraps.  For how can interest properly constrain interest?  Something else is needed if interest is to be totally restrained; otherwise, it remains in control.  But our minimal morality does not require total restraint:  all it requires is that moral interests be able to outweigh (override) other (nonmoral) interests.  It is when our moral interests fail to override our nonmoral interests in conflicts with others that we act self-interestedly, i.e. unrestrained by the appropriate regard for their interests.


3.  Interested Value vs. Moral Value

Bradley has a different problem with a reliance on interests in answering the ybmoral question, viz.:  morality is simply not the kind of thing that can depend upon interests.  The incompatibility between person’s interests and morality is, as we have seen, a hallmark of the Kantian approach to ethics:  “the categorical imperative ... is founded on no interest (Interesse) and can thus alone, among all possible imperatives, be unconditional”.​[11]​  Bradley reflects this approach, and in his essay introducing the ybmoral question he emphasizes two critical points.  First, morality is intrinsically valuable in a manner logically distinct from interests; and second, morality cannot be merely the means to interested ends without abrogating what makes morality distinctively valuable.​[12]​

First, supposing that a moral action might depend on a particular person’s interests appears to contradict morality’s intrinsic independence from interests.  Bradley argues:

...we desert a moral point of view, ... we degrade and prostitute virtue, when to those who do not love her for herself we bring ourselves to recommend her for the sake of her pleasures.  (Bradley 1927, p. 63.)

For the purposes of this essay, morality has been identified minimally as involving some constraint on one’s own interests out of regard for those of others, so here we cannot pretend that morality is independent from interest.  However, let us concede the substance of Kant’s categorical imperative by allowing that what makes something moral may be both unconditional (unbedingt) and universal (allgemein), and therefore logically independent of the interests of any particular individual.​[13]​  This notwithstanding that it may suppose that certain relations should hold (unconditionally and universally) between the interests of different individuals.  That is, taking “depend” in a formal sense, we allow that what is right cannot be defined in terms of what anybody may want to do or want to be right.  But it does not follow that a particular moral action cannot causally depend for its occurrence on some person’s interest.​[14]​  Granting that what makes an action moral is as independent of particular persons’ interests as what makes 2 + 2 equal 4, it does not follow that contingent interests cannot be responsible for an instance of moral behavior – any more than it follows that contingent interests cannot bring about the addition of two things to another two things.  Interests and morality indeed represent distinct kinds of intrinsic value.  However, nothing prevents one and the same thing from having two disparate types of value.  A painting can have both aesthetic and monetary value; a meal can have both gustatory and nutritional value.   So also the same particular action can have both moral value (unconditionally, for everybody) and interested value (contingently, for the person performing it), despite the fact that the two are essentially distinct.  Consequently, Bradley’s first point fails to establish that the occurrence of a moral act cannot causally depend upon someone’s interests.  


4.  Rightness and Goodness

However, even granting that the formal independence of moral acts from particular interests does not rule out causal dependence for their occurrence, the assumption remains that persons are moved to do the right thing only when it is in their interest.  This raises Bradley’s second critical point:  if morality is merely the means to some other end, whatever intrinsic value it may have seems irrelevant.  He says, “to take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end is in direct antagonism to the voice of the moral consciousness”.​[15]​  What is at issue, then, is what is required to make a person’s action genuinely moral.  We can separate out two independent elements of moral correctness:  the rightness of outcome and the goodness of intent.  Kant famously distinguishes between the man of good morals and the morally good man:

    There is no difference, however as regards conformity of conduct to the moral law, between a man of good morals (bene moratus) and a morally good man (moraliter bonus) – at least there ought to be no difference, save that the conduct of the one has not always, perhaps has never, the law as its sole and supreme incentive while the conduct of the other has it always.  (Kant 1793, p. 25.)

The important implication for our purposes is that the conformity of conduct to moral requirements can be determined separately from issues of intent.  Suppose you hear “The innocent man has gone free”.  You know this is the right outcome (at least, all other things being equal) regardless of the intentions of any persons involved; indeed, it could be entirely unintentional, e.g. a villain’s accidental slip-up or simply an “act of God”.  We will here identify rightness as the component of moral correctness that can be assessed independent of intentionality.​[16]​  Minimally, we have characterized morality as a kind of constraint on a person’s own interests out of regard for the interests of others – let that now serve as the standard for the rightness of outcomes.  For example, the innocent man going free reflects regard for his interests notwithstanding the interests of those who would imprison him – this regardless of how that freedom was achieved, whether intentionally or purely by accident.
 
By contrast, the goodness of persons – being a morally good man or woman – does depend entirely on the nature of their intent, as one (Kant in particular) would expect.  But this is not a simple matter.  We can distinguish at least four different levels of intentionality with which a person may be involved in a right outcome.  Suppose P (chooses and) does A, and that A is the right thing to do, viz. a right outcome; “P wants X” may be taken as shorthand for “X is an interest of P’s”.  

Level 0:  P does not know A is right. 

Level 1:  P knows A is right, but does not do A because P wants what is right (but for some other “ulterior” reason).  

Level 2:  P knows A is right, and does A because under the circumstances P wants what is right.  

Level 3:  P knows A is right, and does A because P always wants what is right.  


It has been argued that even Level 1 represents an adequate response to the ybmoral question.  Thus, John Tilley writes:

when “Why be moral?” is a serious issue it often means this:  “Why should I regularly ... do the outward deeds required by morality?”  .... Here the term “be moral” has a nonrobust sense.  By this I mean that whether a person is moral in this sense depends solely on his outward behavior.​[17]​

Since Hobbes, philosophers have generally agreed that most persons have a reason to go along with a general system of rules that, while placing some restraint on the individual pursuit of interest, more than compensates for this with the benefits of cooperative behavior.  Note that this is not just grounds for a society to adopt such rules; it is in the overall interest of each and every individual in that society:  both we and I benefit.  So there inarguably is a reason for a person to go along with right conduct under such circumstances, and this may be enough to answer the ybmoral question for individuals unfamiliar with the insights of social contract theory – of Hobbes, Hume, Baier, Gauthier, Rawls, etc.  But for Bradley this response is insufficient; for, while one may do what morality would “outwardly” require, there is no commitment to rightness per se:  

to do good for its own sake is virtue, to do it for some ulterior end or object, not itself good, is never virtue; and never to act but for the sake of an end, other than doing well and right, is the mark of vice.  (Bradley 1927, p.62.)

For, in different circumstances, one might well be moved to do the exact opposite, a point underlined by Kant:

For in the case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it conform with the moral law but it must also be done for its sake; if not, that conformity is only very contingent and precarious, because the immoral ground will indeed now and then produce actions that conform with the law, but in many cases actions that are contrary to it.​[18]​ 

Consequently, more particularly, we are looking for a reason to be morally good, and not simply to be of good morals:  we are looking for a reason to be a good person, and not simply a justification for outwardly compliant conduct.

Alternatively, it may seem that Level 2 intentionality is sufficient to establish moral goodness in a person:  after all, one is doing what is right because it is right.  But an example makes clear why this is not enough.  Suppose that evil Mr. X has a dire enemy Mr. Y, and knows that Y has a delicate heart condition and would be thrown into a fatal rage should X win the approval of others.  X cunningly takes advantage of an opportunity for public altruism – he rescues a child from kidnappers (at, it happens, no risk to himself) – and, as he hopes, the consequent public acclaim throws Y into a rage that indeed triggers a fatal heart attack.  Suppose it is crucial to X’s twisted, ironic plan that the act which enrages Y be right.  Now while X’s motivation with respect to Y is undoubtedly evil, his rescue of the child is not only the right thing to do but intentionally so.  X has certainly acted evilly with respect to Y, but has not only done right by the child but done so because it was right!  Does that make X at least good in that respect?  It seems clear that, while the intent to rescue the child may be good taken in isolation, in this case it is far outweighed by the sadistic intent to kill Y.  So being a good person requires not simply doing right because it is right but also that the commitment to rightness be unconditional.  To be morally good one must want to do the right thing in every relevant circumstance, i.e. whenever one’s interests come into conflict with someone else’s.  That is to say, on the present account moral goodness requires Level 3 intentionality.

Kant would agree that the morally good person must always (unconditionally) be motivated by what is right.  But, unlike our Level 3, he denies that that motivation could possibly lie in a person’s interests.  As we have seen, this may reflect a conflation of what makes something right with what (on some occasion) makes something right happen; the former may be unconditional and universal, but not so the latter.  Regardless, on the present account it is not necessary, or even possible, for a morally good person to be completely disinterested; instead, we are requiring that such persons be interested in doing the right thing in any situation wherein the interests of others are involved.  In this respect we have, as it were, a through-the-looking-glass version of Kant’s ethics.  Instead of interests being irrelevant or necessarily excluded, they are essential – for determining what is right as well as for moving persons to do what is right.  Despite this, on both accounts being a morally good person, and not merely a person of good morals, is crucial.  So the ybmoral question finally becomes this:  

(YB4)  Why is it in my interest to constrain my interests out of regard for those of others whenever conflict arises?  

So far as Bradley’s second critical point is concerned, we can now see it is not impossible for morality to be the means to interested ends.  What is required, if this is to constitute goodness in the person doing it, is that it not be merely the means – that rightness be essential to achieving those ends, and that the person’s interest in that rightness be unconditional.  That is, to distinguish themselves from evil Mr. X, morally good persons must be interested in doing what is right in all relevant circumstances, that is to say, in all cases wherein the interests of others are involved.  


5.  Being Reasonable About Conflicts

The preceding explains how what is in my interest can be morality; what still remains to be seen is how morality can be in my interest.  Why would persons be interested in doing what is right whenever their interests come into conflict with those of others?  What can possibly motivate an unqualified willingness to constrain one’s own interests out of regard for other persons’ interests?  If you aren’t a sociopath, many of your interests will already be other-regarding, which is to say, you are yourself interested in what someone else is interested in, simply because they are interested in it.   (For example, the doting husband says to his wife, “If it’s important to you, it’s important to me!”).  But while such interests may indeed incline one towards being moral, by themselves they are insufficient; that is, Kant is undoubtedly correct when he says:

there are ... many souls so attuned to compassion that, even without another motivating ground of vanity, or self-interest, they find an inner gratification in spreading joy around them, and can relish the contentment of others, in so far as it is their work.  But I assert that in such a case an action of this kind – however much it conforms with duty, however amiable it may be – still has no true moral worth....​[19]​

In our terms, even though such actions may bring about right outcomes, they lack the kind of intentionality required of a morally good person.  That is, there remains a crucial difference between doing something because it spreads joy or brings contentment, and doing something because it is right.​[20]​  Morality, as we have taken it, is inherently other-regarding, but not ever form of other-regarding counts as morality.  Certainly, the more other-regarding interests a person has, the more likely that person will find attractive a moral regard for the interests of all.  But the extent of other-regarding concerns will differ widely from one person to another, in terms of the depth and scope of that concern.  So such “altruistic” feelings in themselves neither constitute morality nor guarantee its persuasiveness for any given individual; as per Kant:  “feelings, which by nature differ infinitely in degree from one another, can do little to establish a uniform measure of good and evil” (Kant 1785, p. 442).

Consequently, other-regarding interests are insufficient as such to constitute morality.  If the foregoing stands, what is required for being a morally good person is essentially being interested in being a morally good person, i.e. being interested in being moral as such.  So we can answer the ybmoral question by showing why, for many if not all persons, doing what is right is plausibly in their interest.  And in their interest not merely as a means to some “ulterior” end, e.g. the benefits of social compliance, but as an intrinsic element of what they want.​[21]​  This is where the Ring of Gyges shows its worth.  Suppose an updated version, in which the Ring confers a Jedi-like ability to convince others, with the wave of the hand, that one is showing more than sufficient regard for their interests.  This enables us to strip means from ends, separating the extent to which doing right is merely prudent strategy from the extent to which it is crucial to one’s aims:  a flourish of the be-Ringed hand dismisses any merely ulterior concern.  The things a person finds intrinsically choiceworthy is a factual matter, of course, and will vary through time:  an evolving product of both nature and nurture.  It is not entirely unusual to discover in ourselves an interest (or disinterest) we hadn’t previously identified.  Nonetheless, it is clear from the outset that some persons will have no moral interests:  e.g., the sociopath, A. I. Melden’s “amoral Gyges”.  They will happily use the Ring to sidestep the inconvenient niceties of rightness.  For the rest of us, encumbered as we are with assorted other-regarding interests and the socialization of our upbringings, it is not inconceivable that morality itself – being a moral person – has, or has come to have, some intrinsic attractiveness.​[22]​  But wherein does that attractiveness lie?  Can we offer anything more illuminating than pious appeals to Duty, Virtue, Universal Harmony and the like?

This is one of those times when what we seek lies right before our eyes.  Perhaps the reason to be moral lies in the very assumption of reasonableness.  Supposed in almost every exploration of the ybmoral question is the assumption that morality is a rational enterprise.  Perhaps it is a pseudoquestion – perhaps it asks for a reason where one cannot be found – but then we would reject it precisely because it is irrational.  We expect morality itself to be reasonable, to be able to account for the similarities and differences it holds significant.  We can distinguish different rational disciplines with respect to what they are reasonable about.  Logic is being reasonable about inferences, mathematics is being reasonable about sums and natural science is being reasonable about facts.  How does morality fit in?  A Kantian might suggest something like:  morality is being reasonable about freedom; a consequentialist could say it’s about utility or social welfare.  However, on our minimalist construal, morality – specifically, moral rightness – involves appropriately restraining one’s own interests whenever they come into conflict with those of others.  So here we take morality to be the rational adjudication of the interests of multiple persons; to put it simply, morality is being reasonable about conflicts.  


6.  Pluralism vs. Completeness

This, of course, raises the question of whether there is, or could be, just a single way of being morally reasonable, of being right; certainly, those who emphasize diversity, relativism, multiculturalism, etc. might not agree.  Henry David Aiken, for example, advocates a pluralistic view of moral theory:

Such humanistic principles as “harmony,” “adjustment,” and “least suffering” are implicit to a greater or less degree in many codes of “civilized” peoples.  But they are not universally acknowledged, however desirable they may be from our point of view.  The conclusion cannot be avoided, therefore, that at present there just is not one set of procedures or rules for the validation of moral reasoning to which, regardless of cultural differences, every person is bound.  (Aiken 1952, p. 240.)

One is struck by the odd descriptive/prescriptive ambiguity of these remarks.  Taken simply as an empirical claim that different people in different cultures differ in what they find choiceworthy, pluralism is undeniably true.​[23]​  Inarguably, as a matter of fact, accepted moral rules differ considerably from culture to culture, as do e.g. views on cosmogony.  But as the latter hardly imply there is no uniquely valid cosmogonical view, so the former do not entail there could not be uniquely legitimate rules for the validation of moral reasoning.  Indeed, Aiken acknowledges that “a common social effect of morality is ... to prevent conflict and insure order.”  Yet he regards it as a “blunder” to suppose this might be “paradigmatic for morality in general” (ibid., p. 239).  There may well be cultures which regard efforts at conflict resolution as signs of weakness; some may even regard genocide as the highest social obligation.  But does that require us to stretch the meaning of “morality” to include them?​[24]​  We have argued that matters of fact about what a person finds choiceworthy do have implications regarding what “ought” to be chosen when all other things are equal (see Section 2).  But in the proximity of others – when a decision affects interests beyond one’s own – other things are decidedly unequal.  Perhaps, in view of the concerns of others, one “ought not” after all:  how to tell?  The problem with pluralism is that it provides no basis for resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise when the interests of others intrude.  We end up with people and cultures pursuing their own moral rules – their own individual or cultural interests – without regard for those of others.  In effect, then, pluralism amounts to individual- or group-based self-interest.

This comes out clearly in the arguments of another advocate, John Kekes.  He finds the basis for pluralism in the evident diversity of values held by different persons and different traditions:

conflicts among reasonable conceptions of the good life and reasonable values must be recognized as unavoidable features of an adequate understanding of morality and politics.​[25]​

However, he sees conflict primarily in terms of intrapersonal relations between values instead of interpersonal relations between different persons; revealingly, he frames the discussion in terms of abstract, ownerless “values” instead of something person-laden like “interests”.  Consequently, for Kekes the resolution of conflict requires determining which value is more important.  Given the de facto diversity of views regarding what is important, he makes the same descriptive/prescriptive leap as Aiken and concludes that monism cannot be true:  “the claim that any particular value should always override any incompatible and incommensurate value that may conflict with it is bound to be arbitrary” (p. 22).  Living a good life is Kekes’s fundamental normative concern, and he sees it as depending upon components that are nonmoral (“personal satisfaction”) as well as moral (“moral merit”).  But while regarding both requisite, he finds that sometimes we are confronted by his version of moral conflict:  viz., finding within oneself an incompatibility between one’s moral and nonmoral values.  

For one of the complications to which pluralism gives rise is that the moral and nonmoral components of a good life may conflict, and it may be reasonable, in some circumstances, to resolve the conflict in favor of the nonmoral component.  (P. 10.)

The pluralism of this conception of reasonableness is obvious, for whoever is on the losing end of the nonmorality will not find it “reasonable” to suffer those consequences; remember, we are dealing with a zero-sum game.  More importantly, it makes clear that a prime consequence of Kekes’s pluralism is the legitimization of self-interest.

So how does he propose to handle interpersonal disagreements?  Since Kekes regards conflict as fundamentally between values, he supposes that people can resolve their differences insofar as they share values:

Even if we are moved by utterly different systems of values, we are still human beings, and hence we are going to prize, if we are reasonable, the primary values, which must be recognized in all systems of values.  There will normally be some commonly shared values that may be appealed to in settling at least some conflicts.  (P. 26.)

But how does this work?  We have already seen that pluralism cannot advance reasonable agreement when there is fundamental disagreement as to what counts as being “reasonable”.  Furthermore, Kekes’s reliance on shared values to resolve interpersonal conflict is misguided on two counts.  First, it ignores the possibility that people with even 99% of their values in common may nonetheless violently disagree over the remaining 1%.  The fact that they agree about A through Y provides in itself no ground for resolving (and actually might exacerbate) a dispute over Z.  Indeed, some of the most internecine conflicts occur between parties that share the vast majority of their culture and values:  Protestant vs. Catholic, Sunni vs. Shia, Republican vs. Democrat, etc.​[26]​  Second, even fully sharing values – having 100% agreement as to what is valuable – may cause conflict rather than resolve it.  Kekes regards “primary values” as those which are “universally human”:  “we [all] need to eat, drink, and breathe”, and so forth (pp. 38-39).  However, while persons may agree completely regarding a primary value, e.g. the benefits of eating, they may still conflict irreconcilably over who gets to eat the apple they have just found.  That is, not all conflicts between persons are conflicts between the values they hold; sometimes conflicts between persons arise because they hold the same values.​[27]​  Imagine multiple smitten swains vying for the same sweet maid.

This lays bare an inherent difficulty with any view that postulates a plurality of distinct, equally “reasonable” approaches.  As Kurt Baier points out with respect to egoism, the defect lies precisely in a limitation in the ability to adjudicate interpersonal conflicts of interest:  

by ‘the moral point of view’ we mean a point of view which is a court of appeal for conflicts of interest.  Hence it cannot (logically) be identical with the point of view of self-interest.  (Baier 1958, p. 190.)

Insofar as we suppose there might be more than one way to resolve conflicts of interest, which result in materially distinct solutions so far as the participants are concerned, we no longer have such a court of appeal.  The conflict will abide.  So the inadequacy of any view that would legitimize multiple distinct standards of rightness is conspicuous:  such a morality is inherently incomplete, i.e. there are conflicts of interest – specifically, those between those distinct standards – that in principle it cannot address.  In other words, the pluralist faces this dilemma:  either there is an effective procedure for adjudicating conflicts between distinct conceptions of the good life, or there isn’t.  If there is, we have replaced pluralism with monism; if there isn’t, we are saddled with conflicts that no amount of pluralistic reasonableness can ever resolve.​[28]​

Therefore, if indeed the advantage of morality lies in the rational adjudication of (interpersonal) conflicts of interest, then it should be complete:  capable of addressing each and every one.  And only a monistic morality can be rationally objective in the sense of being equally justifiable to everyone.  Which is to say, from “the moral point of view” there can be but one standard of rightness.  Even so, even if there is just one and only one reasonable way to resolve conflicts of interest, the court remains out as to exactly what form that reasonableness should take.  It might appear, then, that Reasonableness is not that much of an advance on Duty, Virtue and Universal Harmony.  Still, it is not implausible to assume that many readers have their own more specific conception of what counts as rationality when it comes to adjudicating conflicts of interest, be it deontological, consequentialist, or whatever.  It is in terms of the intrinsic importance of that rationality that they can ask themselves, “Why should I be moral?”


7.  Deciding To Do What Is Right

Why would one find moral rationality intrinsically valuable?  We must presume that being reasonable about conflicts of interest is separate and distinct from other forms of reasonableness, whether about inferences, sums or facts.  We also require that it be more than just reasonableness per se, pace R. M. Hare.​[29]​  Still, on the monistic assumption that there is one and only one standard of rightness, we can distinguish at least three characteristics of morality-specific rationality that appear to be attractive in and of themselves:  its defensibility, its facilitation of cooperation and its communal inclusiveness.  

First, morality is essential for the rational defensibility of one’s actions.  In any conflict of interest, there will be a clear-cut difference between following morality and following self-interest:  between the right thing to do and a course of action that inappropriately disregards the interests of others.  Namely, only a moral action is rationally justifiable to all others:  that is, only the right thing can be rationally validated to anyone involved in a conflict of interest.​[30]​  

Second, morality represents the only means of obtaining rational cooperation.  This follows from morality’s justifiability:  any less than moral plan would by definition fail to reasonably resolve conflicting approaches.  Suppose a thief brandishes a knife and says, “Give me your money.”  While it would be rational to “cooperate” given the lethal consequences of non-compliance, it clearly is not rationally justifiable that you should suffer the arbitrary burden of that threat.  In contrast, proposing what is right is obviously an optimal strategy for fostering mutual effort:  moral options provide the least grounds for rational disagreement.​[31]​  On the contrary, self-interested options, in virtue of their disregard of the interests of others, inherently foster disunity.  The benefits of cooperation, of avoiding disunity, are indisputable.  

Third, morality is necessary for inclusion and participation in the reasonable community, where “the reasonable community” refers to those united by a common commitment to the rational adjudication of conflicts of interest.  Every time you selfishly disregard the interests of another, you estrange yourself from them – you establish a relation of enmity, not just with that person but with every reasonable individual.  That unjustifiability frays the social fabric around you and leads beyond the pale; at the extreme, as John Locke puts it, “such Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of Reason ... and so may be treated as Beasts of Prey” (Locke 1689, 2nd Treatise, Ch. 3, Sec. 16, p. 319).  If you are not to disassociate yourself from the common good and put yourself at odds with the reasonable community, you must be moral.


Now, whatever else you may think, those are pretty decent reasons for being moral!  Arguably they are enough, for many persons in many situations, to override more self-directed concerns.  Are they enough for you?  Put on the Ring of Gyges:  it will allow you to disregard without penalty the interests of others.  Consider some of the occasions when you might stray from rightness, when the Ring might prove particularly handy:  short-changing a clerk, telling a lie to avoid inconvenience or embarrassment, illicitly parking in a handicapped spot, cheating on your taxes, shoplifting, making a promise you suspect you may not be able to keep, cheating on your partner, cutting in line, driving while intoxicated, failing to return a loaned object, assaulting someone, taking supplies from work, downloading pirated materials, trespassing, committing plagiarism ... the list goes on.  It should be clear that, as a matter of fact, the innate attractions of being moral do not always outweigh a person’s more selfish concerns.  Some people may resist temptation better than others, but very few can honestly claim to have hands absolutely clean.  If you follow the news, it should be evident that the inherent allure of morality is often insufficient to carry the day.  If the hope in asking the ybmoral question were to find a magic answer that could convince anyone and everyone always to do what is right – or at least everyone except the sociopath – then on the present account that hope is dashed.​[32]​  On the other hand, if the reason for asking “Why should I be moral?” is to request clarification of the advantages of being a morally good person, then with any luck these remarks will have made a positive contribution.  Still, it would be wise not to overrate the results.  Recall that we are working with a minimal specification of morality, as a constraint on one’s own interests out of regard for those of others.  The nature of that constraint and regard has been left unspecified, and there are innumerable ways of filling it in.  Nonetheless, a case has been made that moral rationality has a number of intrinsic attractions regardless.

Does this answer the ybmoral question?  Rodger Beehler, in an exchange with Nielsen, points out that one cannot simply choose to find morality intrinsically valuable:

But if you don’t have a regard for, say, honesty now, how are you to decide to have one?  My trouble is not:  I cannot see what sort of thing would be a reason for deciding.  My trouble is:  is this the sort of thing you can decide?​[33]​
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^1	  For example, see Nielsen (1984), where egoism is characterized as:  “Everyone should look after his own interests regardless of the interests of others” (p. 143).  The “regardless” qualification is not always remarked, as in Bloomfield (2008a), p. 256:  “our paradigm of immorality is someone who acts unfailingly for his or her own perceived benefit, attempting to maximize it.”  The problem with the latter characterization, as we shall see, is that it overlooks the possibility that a person may have other-regarding or moral interests – i.e., a self’s interests (as contrasted with “self-interests”) need not inherently disregard those of others.  Someone perceiving benefit in morality would not be a “paradigm of immorality”.
^2	  This is elaborated in the Bayesian approach to decision theory; see e.g. Jeffrey (1983) or Resnik (1987).  Some have argued that satisficing provides a better model of how people actually choose, e.g. Simon (1956).  However, even if this is the case, the justification for satisficing would presumably still be Bayesian, i.e. as a way to avoid the calculative and epistemological burdens of full-blown maximization.
^3	  Cf. Baier (1958), p. 190:  “For morality is designed to apply in just such cases, namely, those where interests conflict”; also Nielsen (1984), p. 163:  “Ask yourselves why it is that we have a morality ....  It seems to me evident that the most central reason ... is that we need some way of fairly and equitably adjudicating conflicts of interest”; also Toulmin (1968), pp. 156-157:  “The notions of ‘duty’, of ‘obligation’, of ‘morality’ are derived from situations in which the conduct of one member of  community prejudices the interests of another, and are to be understood as part of the procedure for minimising such conflicts.”  Of course, traditionally morality is concerned with duties to oneself as well as duties to others (as a Kantian would put it); see e.g. Falk (1965).  Here we are concerned with only the latter; it seems relatively uncontroversial that dealing with the interests of others raises issues of its own.
^4	  Kant would agree; see Sullivan (1989), p. 247:  “for every juridical duty a person has, there is a corresponding right ... possessed by the person or persons to whom that individual has that duty.”
^5	  Bayles (1973) explores some of the different interpretations.
^6	  See Nielsen (1963), Nielsen (1984), Nielsen (1984a), van Ingen (1994), Thornton (1964) and Overvold (1984).
^7	  Overvold (1984), p. 496; cf. Frankena (1963), p. 98:  “nonmoral justification is not necessarily egoistic or prudential.”
^8	  Nielsen (1984), p. 156:  “It is a truism to say that if something is genuinely in one’s self-interest then one, everything else being equal, ought to do it”; cf. Baier (1958) and Thomas (1980).  The ceteris paribus clause effectively screens out moral complications; other things become particularly unequal when the interests of others are involved, as we find in Section 6.
^9	  Cf. Pritchard (1976), p. 123:  “Restating the question in terms of ‘self-interest should’ is question-begging”.  A number of philosophers have found contradiction in the idea that there might be self-interested reasons for being moral; see e.g. Scriven (1966), Hospers (1972) and Thornton (1964).  For a critique, see Tilley (2006); however, Tilley is working with a non-robust conception of morality – see Section 4 below.
^10	  A variety of articles reflecting this reaction against social-moral constraints can be found in Bloomfield (2008) and Paul (1997).
^11	  Kant (1785), p. 432.  He in fact allows for rational Interesse, distinguishing practically taking an interest from pathologically acting from interest (p. 413n).  Cf. Rawls (2000), pp. 177-180.  However, that distinction largely collapses on our interpretation of “interest”; i.e., here even moral interests – insofar as they involve particular, contingent causes – are more akin to Kant’s (pathological) inclinations (Neigungen).
^12	  Points since variously taken up by many others, e.g. Prichard (1912), Melden (1948), Mayberry (1978) and Toulmin (1968).
^13	  As per Kant (1785), p. 432.
^14	  Or, to put it in Aristotelian terms, it is important not to conflate formal with efficient causation.
^15	  Bradley (1927), p. 61.  Cf. Kant (1785), p. 397:  something “to be highly esteemed in itself, and good apart from any further purpose”.
^16	  Kant (1797), p. 214, makes a similar distinction, separating legality (“conformity with juridical laws”) from morality (“conformity with ethical laws”). 
^17	  Tilley (2006), p. 553; cf. Thomas (1980).
^18	  Kant (1785), p. 390; cf. Kant (1793), p. 26:  "it is merely accidental that these causes coincide with the law, for they could equally well incite its violation.”
^19	  Kant (1785), p. 398.  This passage is sometimes seen as illustrating Kant’s antipathy towards human emotions, as e.g. in Singer (1995), p. 183:  “We grasp the moral law [for Kant] because as reasoning beings, we are inevitably aware of it and in awe of it, but we find it fundamentally hostile to our nature as physical, desiring beings.”  The less austere interpretation suggested here is more in line with Paton (1967), p. 53:  “actions which spring from such [good-hearted] emotions are to him [Kant] worthy of love, praise, and encouragement, but they are not properly described as having that unique worth which we have called moral.”
^20	  Herman (1981), p. 365, makes a similar point:  “The man of sympathetic temper, while concerned with others, is indifferent to morality.”  Joyce (2006) concurs, p. 50:  “someone who acts solely from the motive of love or altruism does not thereby make a moral judgment”.
^21	  Contra Thomas (1970), p. 129:  “one would like to suppose that there are good arguments for being moral even if one does not want to be moral for its own sake.”  This is based, in part, on his belief that self-interested and moral behaviors largely coincide; cf. Scheffler (2008) and Raz (1999), Chs. 11-13.  Further examination of that belief will not be attempted here, but for evidence to the contrary the reader is directed to his or her local newspaper.
^22	  Arguably, experiments with the Ultimatum Game reveal the existence of something like a fairness instinct, e.g. Herbert Gintis’s “strong reciprocity”; see Katz (2002) for that and other perspectives.  Fairness, of course, is a plausible candidate for the basis of moral rationality.  Whether moral interests make evolutionary sense is a crucial desideratum, but beyond the scope of these remarks.
^23	  This descriptive truth typically looms large in “naturalistic” attempts to justify prescriptive pluralism; cf. e.g. Harmon (1984) and Wong (2006).
^24	  Cf. Frankena (1965), p. 17:  “No doubt one wants some term for all such codes, but it may be that to call them all ‘moralities’ is an undesirable departure from our traditional conception of such an institution.”
^25	  Kekes (1993), p. 21; subsequent references are to that text.  Of course, a plurality in conceptions of the good life is not the same as a plurality in conceptions of moral reasonableness; monism is prima facie compatible with the former; here we are only concerned with the latter. 
^26	  Of course, were persons placed in a situation that mutually threatens their shared values – say a natural or other disaster that menaces everyone alike – then the leverage of that commonality might overcome their differences.  For a recent cinematic example, see Cowboys & Aliens.  Unfortunately, such situations are extremely rare.
^27	  It could be argued that this is still a disagreement over values; they simply need to be spelt out more particularly, e.g. the value of “my eating the apple” versus “your eating the apple”.  But then there is no longer any pretense that “primary” values are universally shared.
^28	  Kekes seems to straddle the line here.  On the one hand, he denies having a “method” or “clear and precise action-guiding prescription”; but on the other, he assures us that exceptions to his recursive conflict-resolving procedure are “bound to be rare”, at least among “reasonable” people (pp. 25-26).  Even should the coherence of this withstand scrutiny, Kekes would still face the dilemma in the text.
^29	  Notwithstanding Hare (1965), mere universalizability is not enough.
^30	  Various authors have remarked on the importance of justifiability in ethics; see Singer (1981) and Scanlon (1998).  Rawls (2000) finds elements of this in Kant; see p. 192.
^31	  Of course, one can disagree with an option, not because it is wrong, but because other equally right options are better in other ways (e.g., more mutually profitable).
^32	  Contra Bloomfield (2008a); the essential difficulty with Bloomfield’s approach is that proving “pleonectics” lose self-respect does not guarantee they will in fact be interested in the “happiness” he supposes that precludes.  Cf. Joyce (2008).
^33	  Beehler (1972), p. 16; see Nielsen (1959), Nielsen (1972) and Beehler (1972a).
^34	  Cf. Frankena (1968), p. 132:  "it may be, as our insight ... increases, we shall more and more come to see that the finally rational way of life for the individual is or at least may be precisely the socially considerate one.”
